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Abstract
This paper develops a signalling model to investigate a rm's optimal nancial re-
sponse to corporate income taxation under informational asymmetries. The model obtains
informationally constrained ecient equilibria in which a rm's debt level and inside equity
position jointly serve as a single separating signal. Separating equilibria are characterized
dierently depending upon the tax obligation and the relative protability of a high-quality
rm. When the quality dierence between rms is relatively large, a high-quality rm
shows a unique optimal capital structure, in which the debt-equity ratio is increased as
the tax rate rises but is reduced as the rm's protability increases.
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1I. Introduction
Although there have been numerous studies on the nancial behavior of rms, a few
strands of the literature on capital structure still have loose ends, and one of them is with
regard to the consequences of the corporate income tax on a rm's capital structure in the
existence of asymmetric information.
The Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Theorem (MM Theorem) stands rm under condi-
tions of complete information and competitive markets without taxes. The MM Theorem
serves as a basis of the assumption, which has been used in many tax studies including
the traditional general equilibrium analysis, that rms do not alter their nancial struc-
ture and all new projects are nanced by equity issue. This assumption is unrealistic for
obvious reasons such as the tax shield provided by the corporate income tax, but a more
satisfactory method to model endogenous capital structure in a tax study has yet to be
developed.
On the other hand, the capital structure literature is abundant with attempts to
explore the consequences of market imperfections caused by uncertainty or asymmetric
information. For example, the pecking order theory was reinforced by Myers and Majluf
[1984], the eect of agency costs was highlighted by Jensen and Meckling [1976], and
signalling models became a familiar approach to the determination of nancial structure
(Ross [1987]).
A variety of signalling vehicles have been employed in signalling models, such as
debt level in Ross [1977], inside equity position in Leland and Pyle [1977], underpricing
in Rock [1986] and dividends in John and Williams [1985]. In particular, Leland and
Pyle [1977] and Ross [1977] obtain a unique separating equilibrium in which the MM
Theorem is held to be valid in the sense that the value of a rm is identical to that in
the rst best equilibrium under perfect information. Combining their signal vehicles into
2one and considering a corporate income tax system, this paper intends to examine a rm's
optimal capital structure and its response to tax changes in a market with informational
asymmetries. More precisely, both debt level and inside equity position of a rm are the
means of passing project risk on to outside investors and hence serve as a signal for the
rm's true quality which is private information. We rst characterize the equilibrium
capital structure of a rm without taxes, and then, employing the corporate income tax
system in DeAngelo and Masulis [1980], investigate the relationship between the capital
structure and exogenous factors including the tax rate.
Although there have been many studies on the eects of corporate income taxation
on rms' nancial decisions under uncertainty, only a few of them have considered asym-
metric information. For example, John and Williams [1985] and Bernheim [1991] oer
explanations of the dividend puzzle using signalling with taxable dividends, and MacKie-
Mason [1990] incorporates various signalling costs in an empirical investigation of tax
consequences. In contrast, this paper highlights the risk sharing induced by the incentive
compatibility principle of signalling with nancial structures.
A rm's inside equity position signals the quality of the rm by showing the extent of
entrepreneur's willingness to bear the risk of his own rm, and has been used in previous
signalling models such as Leland and Pyle [1977], Grinblatt and Hwang [1989], Bajaj, Chan
and Dasgupta [1998], and Cheong [1998]. Of these models, the rst three do not consider
the corporate income tax and limited liability of equity holders, and the last does not
include debt nancing by rms. Furthermore, they neglect the informational content of
debt. On the other hand, the debt-signalling model in Ross [1977], in which a rm's debt
level serves as a signal by the rms' manager facing the incentive compensation schedule,
ignores the tax shield eect as well as other aspects of a rm's nancial structure. In
contrast, this paper considers both debt level and inside equity position of a rm which
are jointly decided and both carry essential information for outsider investors' evaluation
3of a rm.
The idea of joint determination of debt level and inside equity position is not new. It
is, in fact, central in Jensen and Meckling's [1976] theory of agency costs and is empirically
supported according to Crutchley and Hansen [1989]. 1 It is also modelled as a manager's
optimal behavior in the corporate control contest by Stulz [1988] and Israel [1992]. Unlike
these studies, entrepreneurial risk aversion creates the basic motivation for their voluntary
transfer of information through signalling in our model.
Among the many equilibria obtained in our signalling model, we focus on the Pareto-
dominant separating equilibrium which is informationally-constrained ecient and sup-
ports only protable projects as in the case of complete information. It is, however,
characterized dierently with and without the corporate income tax. Without the corpo-
rate income tax, the optimal capital structures of both the high-quality and low-quality
rms are not unique and the high-quality rms' inside equity position and debt level are,
respectively, bounded from below and bounded from above unlike those of the low-quality
rms. Other things being equal, the high-quality rms hold more inside equity than the
low-quality rms with the same debt level and issue less debt than the low-quality rms
with the same inside equity position.
Under the corporate income tax system, we nd two dierent types of separating
equilibria: one allowing for tax exhaustion for all rms and the other requiring the high-
quality rms to pay taxes. Intuitively, the rst type of equilibrium prevails when the
high-quality rms are not much better than the low-quality rms, but the second type
emerges when the quality dierences are so large that low-quality rms have a strong
incentive to pretend to be high-quality rms. In the second type of separating equilibrium,
high-quality rms show unique nancial behavior and their debt-equity ratio increases
1 There are also empirical ndings against the hypothesis of joint determination. See,
for example, Chaplinsky and Niehaus [1993].
4with the tax rate but decreases with their protability. The latter result is particularly
signicant since it is consistent with the common empirical ndings that leverage ratios
are inversely related to protability, which contradicts the prediction made by previous
signalling models, such as Leland and Pyle [1977] and Ross [1977]. In this sense, this
paper extends the usefulness of the signalling approach and enriches our understanding of
rms' nancial behavior under informational asymmetries. Another notable result from
our model is that, unlike other exogenous elements of the model, the tax rate cannot serve
as a determining factor of the type of equilibrium.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model. Sections III and IV
are the main body of the paper, discussing the separating equilibria without the corporate
income tax system and then with the tax system. Section IV also includes the results from
comparative statics, and the concluding comments are shared in Section V.
II. Model
We consider the nancial market with adverse selection due to private information on
the true quality of rms. Entrepreneurs set up rms to execute their own risky projects.
They are risk averse, and seek external nancing as a means of passing on project risk.
We assume project risk is all idiosyncratic so that it can be freely absorbed in a well-
diversied portfolio of an outside investor. Therefore, if the quality of rms are known
publicly, all entrepreneurs can eectively cash their projects, and neither entrepreneurs
nor outside investors will bear any more than a negligible amount of risk. However, such
behavior is not possible when the information on rms' quality is not shared by outside
investors. Outside investors know the population distribution of rms of dierent quality,
but cannot tell one from the other. In order to overcome such informational asymmetries,
entrepreneurs (or rms) send signals to outside investors. As in Leland and Pyle [1977],
Grinblatt and Hwang [1989], Bajaj, Chan and Dasgupta [1998], and Cheong [1998], the
5previous studies with similar settings, an entrepreneur signals the quality of his own rm
by announcing his inside equity position which indicates the extent of his willingness to
bear the rm's risk. Our model, however, departs from the earlier models by considering
debt as an additional means of signalling. In our model, a rm issues both equity and debt,
both of which carry information on the quality of the rm and, thereby, complement each
other as signalling vehicles. Along with inside equity position, the level of risky debt signals
the entrepreneur's willingness to bear the rm's risk, revealing the unused debt capacity
which otherwise could have been used to reduce his risk-bearing. Under a corporate income
tax system with debt deduction, the unused debt capacity also shows the entrepreneur's
willingness to sacrice the benet of the tax shield since not being able to issue as much
debt as possible is a costly burden on the entrepreneur. Our model explicitly considers
these dual eects of debt and, in this sense, extends the analysis of Ross [1977] on the role
of debt without taxes.
There are two periods in our model. In the rst period, entrepreneurs set up their own
rms, issue equity and debt as they announce their inside equity positions, and execute
their projects using the cash-
ow from the equity and debt sale and from their initial
wealth (denoted by w0). All remaining wealth is invested in a risk-free security which earns
a xed rate of return (denoted by r). In the second and nal period, project outcome is
known. Debt is rst paid back (in the face value), the corporate tax is paid next, and
then the rest is divided among the equity holders. Firms are dismantled as their projects
become useless after being used once, and all consumption occurs in this period.
For simplicity, we assume there are only two possible outcomes from a project, and
denote them as y1 and y2, where 0  y1 < K < y2 and K is the xed capital outlay. We
further assume that there are only two types of projects, so that they are conveniently
identied by the probability of the better outcome (denoted by P2 while P1 denotes the
6probability of the worse outcome). 2 We call a rm/project/entrepreneur with the higher
P2 a high type and one with the lower P2 a low type.
Following DeAngelo and Masulis [1980], we consider the corporate income tax system
that allows expensing and debt payment deduction but not loss osets. Under this tax
system, a rm has a positive tax obligation only if it truly earns economic prots after
debt payment; that is, only if its project output exceeds the total of the debt deduction
and the opportunity cost of capital expense. Since the debt payment is deductible from
the tax base, rms want to borrow as much as possible. We assume, however, there is a
xed ceiling to debt level, which is set at y2. 3 On the other hand, debt below y1 is risk
free and, hence, it does not carry any information about the rm's quality. In order to
have debt as a meaningful signalling vehicle, we assume all debt is risky and, therefore, it
follows that y1  D  y2.
Under the expensing scheme, the capital outlay is immediately written o, and the
tax base only includes economic prots. If the tax system comes with the depreciation
scheme, the tax base would include not only economic prots but also the opportunity cost
of the capital outlay which could be earned untaxed elsewhere. This kind of distortion,
which exists in reality, is ignored in this model but its consideration would not aect our
main results. Due to the proportional nature of the corporate income tax, the risk held
inside a rm is partly shared by the government in the sense of Domar and Musgrave
[1944]. Although it is not as strong as in a model with the full loss oset provision, the
2 Such assumption of two types is often made in the literature and increasing the number
of types of projects will not detract from the main story as long as types are discrete.
Cheong [1998] illustrates how a separating equilibrium obtained with two types can be
extended to a three-type case. If types are continuous, our model will be modied in such
a way that P2 is a function of signals, thereby serving as an evaluation schedule for outside
investors.
3 The debt ceiling of y2 may seem arbitrarily high; however, setting it at values lower
than y2 would not aect the main results in the paper as long as it is exogenously given
in the model.
7risk-sharing eect in our model illustrates the discrepancy between private risk-taking and
social risk-taking. 4 We assume the details of the tax system are publicly known and
taken as given by entrepreneurs and outside investors.
III. No Tax Case
Without the corporate income tax, borrowing does not create the advantage of tax
shields and, therefore, debt and equity serve equally as means of spreading project risk.
A separating equilibrium in the nancial market incorporates the incentive of a high-type
entrepreneur to distinguish himself from low-type rms and that of a low-type entrepreneur
to pretend to be a high type. A separating equilibrium is characterized by each type's
signal and outside investors' evaluation schedule that is consistent with the rms' beliefs on
which their signals are based. As is often the case with a signalling game, we nd a multiple
of separating equilibria in our model and, among them, we focus only on the Pareto-
dominant separating equilibrium in which a low-type rm obtains his rst-best utility. 5
Consequently, the equilibrium behavior of a low type is independent of the informational
asymmetries while a high type's equilibrium behavior is aected substantially.
First, it is noted that the combination of inside equity position and debt level that
allows a low type to have his rst best utility is not unique. An entrepreneur can completely
avoid bearing any risk by holding zero inside equity or issuing the maximum debt of y2
and, therefore, it must be the choice of a low type but not a high type in the separating
equilibrium. The equilibrium choice of a high type is obtained as the solution to the high
4 See, for example, Chapter 4 in Atkinson and Stiglitz [1980] for further discussion on
the tax eect on risk-taking.
5 This equilibrium corresponds to the no-waste equilibrium in Milgrom and Roberts
[1982] and is usually chosen as the unique equilibrium. For example, Cheong[1998] ap-
plied Cho-Kreps' [1987] Intuitive Criterion to select this equilibrium, whereas Leland and
Pyle[1976], Ross[1977] and Grinblatt and Hwang [1989] selected this equilibrium in con-
sideration of the low type's interest.
8type's expected utility maximization problem given by
max
H;DH PH
1 u((1 + r)BH) + PH
2 u((1 + r)BH + H(y2   DH))
subject to
u((1 + r)BL) =PL
1 u((1 + r)BH) + PL
2 u((1 + r)BH + H(y2   DH)) (1)
where
BH = (1   H)V H
E + V H
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BL = V L
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j denotes the probability of outcome yj (j = 1;2) of a type i project (i = H (high) or
L (low)) and Bi denotes the wealth of a type-i entrepreneur at the end of the rst period
and V i
E denotes the value of equity of a type-i rm and V i
D denotes the value of debt of a
type-i rm. Equation (1) is the incentive compatibility constraint, of which the left-hand
side is the rst-best utility level of a low-type entrepreneur and the right-hand side is his
expected utility when he successfully imitates a high type's signal (H and DH), so that
he is mistaken as a high type by outside investors.
One can easily see that, in this case, the MM Theorem holds regardless of the rm's
type since for any D,




This result is basically due to the use of expected value pricing without bankruptcy costs
and is also obtained by previous signalling models. However, it is worthwhile to note that
9in our model equity-holders of a rm including the entrepreneur himself bear only a limited
liability up to the amount of their equity investment in the case that the rm defaults.
In contrast, models of the Leland and Pyle type do not distinguish corporate debt from
personal debt, such that an entrepreneur assumes unlimited liability for debt payment.
From the rst order conditions of the high type's optimization, we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 1. The equilibrium inside equity position (H) and debt level (DH) of a
high-type rm is not unique and is, in fact, any combination of H and DH satisfying
H(y2   DH) = X, where 0  H  1, 0  DH  y2, 6 and X is the unique solution to
u(PL
1 y1 + PL
2 y2+(1 + r)(w0   K))
=PL
1 u( PH
2 X + PH
1 y1 + PH
2 y2 + (1 + r)(w0   K))
+ PL
2 u(PH
1 X + PH
1 y1 + PH
2 y2 + (1 + r)(w0   K)) (2)
The signalling equilibrium is characterized as follows: a high-type entrepreneur an-
nounces his choice of H and DH that satises Equation (2). As for a low-type en-
trepreneur, he obtains the rst-best utility level by choosing one of the numerous com-
binations of L and DL satisfying either L = 0 or DL = y2. Observing signals from
rms, outside investors compute (y2   D) for each rm, and consider a rm as a high
type only if the number is equal to X obtained from Equation (2). Such an evaluation
rule for outside investors is consistent with every entrepreneur's expectation and signalling
behavior and, thereby, constitutes the separating equilibrium.
The signalling equilibrium is not ecient in the rst-best sense since not all of the risk
in the market is dissipated but some remains to be borne by high-type rms. The extent to
which high-type entrepreneurs suer from their risk-bearing measures the cost of signalling.
6 As obvious from Equation (2), these constraints on H and DH are not binding, and
the lowest upper bounds and greatest lower bounds can be easily computed.
10From the social viewpoint, the signalling cost is pure resource waste but is unavoidable
in the presence of the market imperfection caused by informational asymmetries. In this
sense, the equilibrium is informationally-constrained ecient.
Proposition 1 also states that the equilibrium signal of a high-type rm is not unique
but it gives the same value to H(y2 DH), which combines the unused portions of the two
risk-spreading vehicles of equity and debt. One immediate implication of the proposition
is that a high-type rm's inside equity position is inversely related to its debt level, other
things being equal. Otherwise identical rms may have dierent nancial structures and,
therefore, rms cannot be distinguished solely on the basis of their outstanding debt level.
A rm with a high debt level could be as good as a rm with a lower debt level if it retains
an appropriate share of inside equity. This is notable considering that previous studies on
capital structure with a focus on debt-equity ratios have often failed to oer a satisfactory
explanation of the diversity of the ratios observed in inter-industry cross-sectional data.
The fundamental reason why the high type's optimal capital structure is not deter-
mined uniquely is that debt and equity issues are equally eective in passing out risk when
there are no taxes. In fact, the rate of the trade-o between holding more inside equity
and issuing more debt from a given capital structure is identical for both types of rms
when low types are perceived as high types by outside investors. The following proposi-
tion shows that the marginal rate of substitution between inside equity and debt does not
depend upon the rm type.
Proposition 2. The indierence curves of a high type and a successfully-imitating low
type are both upward-sloping and concave in the (;D) plane and, furthermore, their
slopes are independent of rm type.
Therefore, a successfully-imitating low type's indierence map is identical to that of
a true high type's although each indierence curve is associated with dierent utility level
11for each type. Figure 1 illustrates a few indierence curves derived from an exponential
utility function. 6 The gure also shows the indierence curve that serves as the incentive
compatible constraint for a high type, on which any combination of debt level and inside
equity position, is a separating signal for a high type.
IV. Tax Consequences
1. Separating Equilibrium
Under the corporate income tax system, a rm pays no taxes except when y2 is realized
and D is chosen so that y2 D  (1+r)K. In this case, the rm rst makes debt payment of
D, then tax payment of t[y2 D (1+r)K], and nally the rest, y2 D t[y2 D (1+r)K],
is paid out to equity holders. If the project outcome is y1, the rm defaults, and the
debt holders claim the whole amount of y1. If the project outcome is y2 but it holds that
y2   D  (1 + r)K, the debt is paid back rst and the rest is all distributed to equity
holders. Therefore, no matter whether y1 or y2 is realized, the total dividend available for
equity holders is (weakly) decreasing in the debt level and, other things being equal, only
rms with relatively lower debt levels pay taxes.
We construct the Pareto-dominating separating equilibrium as done in the previous
section without taxes. First, the value of debt is not aected by the existence of taxes and







; i = H;L:
The value of equity, however, depends upon the amount of tax obligation which in turn de-
pends upon the level of debt. Similarly, the residual output available for each entrepreneur
6 Figure 1 is drawn for the case in which U is an exponential utility function with the
absolute risk aversion coecient being 0.1, that is, u(C) =  e 0:1C. The parameters are




2 = 0:5;K = 20;r =
0:05 and w0 = 10.
12at the end of the second period is dependent on the tax obligation and the level of debt.






if 0 < DH < y2   (1 + r)K; then
È
1 = PH
1 y1 + PH
2 DH + (1 + r)(w0   K)
+ (1   H)PH
2 ((1   )(y2   DH) + (1 + r)K)
È
2 = È
1 + H((1   )(y2   DH) + (1 + r)K)
if y2   (1 + r)K < DH < y2; then
È
1 = PH
1 y1 + PH
2 DH + (1 + r)(w0   K)
+ (1   H)PH
2 (y2   DH)
È
2 = È1 + H(y2   DH) ;
where È
i is the consumption of an entrepreneur perceived as a high type, that is, either
a true high type or a successfully-imitating low type in state i, and È
i diers depending
upon the level of DH. The utility function above decreases in  but increases in D and
is piecewise-continuous. For the range of DH greater than y2   (1 + r)K, the function
is identical to what was previously derived without taxes and, therefore, the indierence
curves are concave with the high type's indierence curves having the same curvature as
those of a successfully-imitating low type. When DH < y2   (1 + r)K, the indierence
curves are still upward-sloping but are distinguished by rm type, and we obtain the
single-crossing property between the types. 7
Proposition 3. For the range of D satisfying D < y2 (1+r)K, other things being equal,
7 In general, the single-crossing property is not necessary for the existence of separat-
ing equilibria but it signicantly simplies the process of nding them. Bernheim [1991]
provides an example of constructing signalling equilibria in a model which violates the
single-crossing property.
13the indierence curves of a high type are 
atter than those of a successfully-imitating low
type.
This single-crossing property is simply due to a low type needing to be compensated
with a larger increase in D than a high type would need for the same marginal increase in ,
while remaining at the same utility level. As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, 8 indierence
curves are one-piece curves with the single-crossing property only if they lie entirely below
the line of D = y2  (1 + r)K; otherwise, they are two-piece, piece-wise continuous curves
with the single crossing property holding only for the debt level below y2   (1 + r)K. 9
Since the indierence curve of a low type associated with his rst-best utility level serves
as the incentive compatibility constraint for a high type, the separating equilibrium diers
depending upon whether that indierence curve is a single-piece or two-piece curve.
In the separating equilibrium, a high type's expected utility, EuH, is maximized sub-
ject to the following incentive compatibility constraint:
u(PL
1 y1 + PL





Using the properties of the indierence curves of both types, the separating equilibrium is
established by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In the separating equilibrium, a low-type rm's optimal choice is any
combination of L and DL such that either (i)L = 0 and DL > y2   (1 + r)K or (ii)
L > 0 and DL = y2. As for the optimal choice of a high-type rm, rst consider D
satisfying
u(PL
1 y1 + PL
2 y2 + (1 + r)(w0   K)) = PL
1 u(PH
1 y1 + PH
2 D + (1 + r)(w0   K))
8 Figures 2 and 3 are drawn using the utility function: u(C) =  e 0:1C : The parameters




2 = 0:8;K =




9 An indierence curve cannot stay entirely above the demarcation, D = y2  (1+r)K,
since it must not cut the vertical axis ( = 0) in the range.
14+ PL
2 u(PH
1 y1 + PH
2 D + (1 + r)(w0   K) + (1   )(y2   D) + (1 + r)K): (4)
If D is lower than or equal to y2   (1 + r)K, a high-type rm holds all equity inside
(H = 1) and D is its optimal debt level. If D is higher than y2   (1 + r)K, the rm
may choose any combination of H and DH satisfying both DH  y2   (1 + r)K and
H(y2   DH) = X, where X is determined by Equation (2).
In equilibrium, a low-type entrepreneur neither bears risk nor pays taxes. The only
dierence from his behavior in the no-tax equilibrium is that he issues enough debt to
exhaust his tax base. His debt level is not uniquely determined and hence his debt-equity
ratio is indenite. If he chooses the debt level of y2, his equity has no market value and,
therefore, the debt-equity ratio is not well dened.
In Proposition 4, D is the maximum debt level that a tax-paying high-type rm can
issue without violating the incentive compatibility constraint. Other things being equal,
it is easy to see that it increases in the true quality of a low-type project. If it is higher
than y2   (1 + r)K, the tax base is exhausted and a high-type rm does not have any
tax obligation. Then no rm pays corporate income taxes and the equilibrium with taxes
is identical to the equilibrium without taxes except that the ranges of the debt level for
each type and the inside equity position of the high type are narrower. In other words,
there exists a continuum of separating signals for a high type as illustrated in Figure 2.
It should be noted, however, that for a given , DH is lower than DL and, for a given
D, H is higher than L. Therefore, types are not revealed by either debt level or inside
equity position alone but by both. For example, a high-type rm may borrow more than
a low-type rm but then it has to hold more inside equity.
In this type of equilibrium, a high type's maximum debt level (denoted by D) and
his minimum inside equity position (denoted by ) are respectively obtained from the
15following equations:
u(PL
1 y1 + PL
2 y2 + (1 + r)(w0   K)) = PL
1 u(PH
1 y1 + PH
2 D + (1 + r)(w0   K))
+ PL
2 u(PH
1 y1 + PH
2 D + (1 + r)(w0   K) + y2   D): (5)
u(PL
1 y1 + PL
2 y2+(1 + r)(w0   K)) = PL
1 u(PH
1 y1 + PH
2 (y2   (1 + r)K)
+ (1 + r)(w0   K) + (1   )PH
2 (1 + r)K)
+PL
2 u(PH
1 y1 + PH
2 (y2   (1 + r)K) + (1 + r)(w0   K)
+ (1   )PH
2 (1 + r)K) + (1 + r)K): (6)
Equation (5) is derived from the incentive compatibility constraint, Equation (3), with D
replacing DH and H being the maximum value, 1. Similarly, Equation (6) is obtained
from the same equation by replacing H by  and DH being the minimum value, y2  
(1 + r)K. It is clear from these equations that the corporate income tax rate does not
aect any of equilibrium characteristics although it distorts the curvature of indierence
curves where DH is below y2   (1 + r)K.
The separating equilibrium is characterized dierently if D is lower than y2 (1+r)K.
In this case, a high-type rm pays corporate income taxes in the amount of PH
2 t[y2  
D  (1+r)K] and its optimal choices of H and DH are uniquely 1 and D, respectively.
Figure 3 illustrates this type of unique separating equilibrium. Intuitively, this is the case
in which a high-type project is far more protable than a low type, so that a low type's
potential gain from successfully pretending to be a high type is very high. To block low
types' mimicking behavior, a high type has to bear the burden of a greater signalling cost,
that is, he not only has to hold all equity inside but also must leave part of the output
unshielded from the corporate income tax. In this case, the signalling cost borne by a
16high type includes the reduced tax shield as well as the forced risk-bearing and tends to
increase as the quality gap between types increases.
There is, however, a limit to the increased signalling cost caused by increases in the
quality gap. Suppose a low-type project has a negative value. It will be not undertaken
neither in the rst-best equilibrium nor in the separating equilibrium in which the true
value is revealed. In this case, a combination of H and DH just sucient to separate from
an imaginary low type with zero value is also sucient to block a low type with any negative
value. Only high types will be seen in the market and their signalling costs and hence the
overall equilibrium characteristics are not aected by the existence of unprotable low-type
rms. This result re
ects the constrained eciency of the signalling equilibrium.
2. Comparative Statics
In the previous sub-section, we constructed the two dierent types of separating equi-
libria: the rst in which no rms pay corporate income taxes and the second in which
only high types do. Since the nancial structure of a low-type rm in equilibrium is rather
trivially determined, here we focus on the nancial structure of a high-type rm. First, we
consider the equilibrium when D is less than or equal to y2   (1 + r)K. In this case, the
separating signal of a high type is uniquely determined and we can then conduct compar-
ative static analysis. We dene the debt-equity ratio of a high type (denoted by lH) as the
ratio of the book value of outstanding debt (D) and the market value of equity (denoted







2 (1   )(y2   D) + (1 + r)K
1 + r
and D is obtained from Equation (4). We further assume that the probability of project
failure does not exceed the corporate tax rate, that is, PH
1 < . While it seems an empirical
17issue whether this assumption is realistic, it is particularly useful since it allows for a
denite sign of the partial derivative of the expected utility of a successfully-imitating low












2 are respectively identical to È
1 and È
2 except H is set to 1. Under the
given assumption, it is easily seen that
@EUL
@D < 0: A careful observation shows that the
rst term on the right-hand side of Equation (7) is due to an increase in the expected value
of debt and the second term is due to a decrease of the expected value of dividend, resulting
from a small increase in D. Therefore, it is suggested that D must be inversely related
to any exogenous variable that has a positive instant eect on the low type's expected
utility since his equilibrium utility level must remain xed at the rst best level. Further
investigation obtains the following results on the debt-equity ratio of a high-type rm.
Proposition 5. If y1 < D < y2 (1+r)K and PH








The rst result in the proposition is that the debt-equity ratio and protability of
a high-type rm are inversely related. As discussed earlier, the more protable a high-
type rm becomes, the larger the potential gain that a low type obtains from successfully
pretending to be a high type; therefore, a high type needs to send a stronger separating
signal. In other words, the pressure on a high-type rm to keep its debt capacity unused
gets stronger, and its debt-equity ratio has to be lowered. This result is consistent with a
salient empirical nding that more protable rms borrow relatively less. Such empirical
result is found in Kester [1986], Titman and Wessels [1988], Baskin [1989], Chaplinsky and
Niehaus [1993] and many others but the result cannot be compromised with the static
trade-o theory or, more importantly, previous signalling models such as in Leland and
Pyle [1977] and Ross [1977]. 10 In this sense, our model highlights the usefulness of the
10 For example, Megginson [1997] writes, While this model [of Ross'] and the other
18signalling approach and thereby contributes to a better understanding of a rm's nancial
behavior under informational asymmetries.
In the same vein, one might speculate that PL
1 would aect lH in a similar way,
thinking that an increase in PL
1 also means a increase in the protability of a high type
relative to a low type. However, it is not an accurate conjecture and the eect of PL
1 on



























2))   (1   )PL
2 u0(È
2)
and 4 is the numerator of VE and È0 = PL
1 y1+PL





is positive under the assumption that PH
1 < , the sign of the numerator
is not determined since the rst term is negative while the second is positive. Intuitively,
those terms respectively represent the two con
icting forces in action when PL
1 increases:
(i) a decrease in the reservation utility of a low type, which gives a stronger incentive to
mimic a high type, and (ii) a decrease in his utility obtained when he successfully pretends.
When the rst tendency dominates the second, high types are forced to bear a greater
signalling cost. Figures 2 and 3 together illustrate such a case in which the equilibrium
type is switched as a result of an increase in PL
1 . However, there is also the possibility
that the second tendency outweighs the rst, allowing high types to raise their debt-equity
ratio in their favor.
The second result in the proposition states that the debt-equity ratio of a high-type
rm increases with the corporate income tax rate. In a sense, it is straightforward since the
tax only aects the protability of a high-type rm but not of a low-type rm and a tax
signaling models that follow, are intuitively attractive, observed capital structure patterns
suggest that they are poor predictors of actual behavior.
19increase makes a high-type rm less protable. It is, however, an interesting comparison
with what was actually observed immediately after the Tax Reform Act 1986, which led to
a small reduction in the eective corporate income tax rate. 11 According to Gordon and
MacKie-Mason [1990], the actual increase in average debt-value ratios was substantially
smaller than the forecast made on the basis of the increased tax advantage of debt over
equity. Their forecast was made using the empirical model of MacKie-Mason [1990], which
includes estimation variables such as ownership dilution, initial discount and dividend
payout but not the joint signal of inside equity position and debt. In contrast, our model
concentrates on the informational content of inside equity position and debt and predicts
that a decrease in tax rate would result in a decrease, rather than an increase, in the
debt-equity ratio. Although the two models are not perfect by themselves, it is suggested
that a comprehensive approach incorporating the two might be able to provide a better
explanation of what happened in reality.
When D is greater than or equal to y2   (1 + r)K, we obtain a dierent type of
equilibrium in which there is a continuum of separating signals for a high type. A high-type
rm does not pay corporate income taxes and, thus, the equilibrium nancial structure is
independent of the tax rate. In this case, comparative static analysis is not possible, and
we instead examine how the ranges of a high type's debt level and inside equity position
are aected by PH
2 .









The sucient condition in Proposition 6 requires that the project output in the good
state must exceed that in the bad state by more than the opportunity cost of capital outlay.
It does not seem to have an intuitive meaning; however, it is more likely to be satised as
11 Gordon and Mackie-Mason [1990] report that the fall in the eective tax rate was
small (from 0.318 to 0.289) relative to the cut in the statutory rates (from 0.46 to 0.34)
due to the simultaneous changes in depreciation and investment tax credits.
20y1 approaches 0, other things being equal.
The above proposition implies that a high type's indierence curve associated with the
equilibrium utility level shifts toward the corner of H being 1 and DH being y2 (1+r)K,
as his project becomes more protable relative to a low type. The range of his equilibrium
signals shrinks and, therefore, he has to lower the debt level if he wants to keep the current
inside position; alternatively, he must increase his inside equity position in order to keep
the current debt level. It is also possible that the current debt level or inside equity
position may not be even feasible. Such a tendency is, in fact, consistent with the result
in Proposition 5 that a high type's signalling cost rises with the relative protability of his
project, although the exact change in his signal cannot be predicted here.
Due to the non-uniqueness of a high type's equilibrium signals, the relationship be-
tween his relative protability and debt-equity ratio is not uniformly determined. However,
it is worthwhile to repeat that it is the combination of debt level and inside equity position
and not the independent value of each that enables outside investors to identify rm types
correctly.
Propositions 5 and 6 provide a comparison of entrepreneurs' reaction to (small)
changes in exogenous variables for each type of equilibrium. As discussed earlier, a change
in an exogenous factor can even lead to a switch of equilibrium types. It should be noted,
however, that type of equilibrium is determined independent of the corporate income tax
rate and cannot be aected by a tax change of any scale although a tax increase does tend
to increase D. 12
Proposition 7. If D < y2   (1 + r)K and PH
1 < , (i) D rises with  but (ii) cannot
rise above y2   (1 + r)K.
12 In fact, equilibrium type may have been equivalently identied on the basis of the
value of D in Equation (5) instead of using D in Equation (4). In that case, it is obvious
that the tax rate does not aect the type of equilibrium since Equation (5) does not include
.
21The implication of Proposition 7 is interesting in that the government can raise the
tax rate without worrying about completely losing the tax base. As the tax rate increases,
the binding constraint on a high type entrepreneur's nancial decision weakens so that he
can borrow more and increase the tax shield; however, there is a limit to this benecial
eect of the tax and he will never achieve tax exhaustion.
V. Concluding Remarks
Developing a simple yet useful signalling model in which inside equity position and
debt level of a rm jointly serve as a signalling vehicle, this paper examines the deter-
mination of a rm's nancial structure under asymmetric information regarding the true
quality of a rm. Unlike other signalling models, our model explicitly considers the limited
liability of equity holders and the corporate income tax with debt deduction and obtains
a set of interesting results.
The Pareto-dominant separating equilibrium is characterized dierently with and
without the corporate income tax although only protable projects are nanced in either
case as if there were no adverse selection problem. Without the corporate income tax,
the rms' equilibrium capital structure is not unique and the high-quality rms' inside
equity position and debt level are, respectively, bounded from below and bounded from
above. Other things being equal, the high-quality rms hold more inside equity than the
low-quality rms with the same debt level and issue less debt than the low-quality rms
with the same inside equity position. Under the corporate income tax system, there are
two dierent types of separating equilibria. In one type of equilibrium, all rms achieve
tax exhaustion and their equilibrium capital structure is not unique. Roughly speaking,
this type of equilibrium prevails when the high-quality rms are not too superior to the
low-quality rms. When the rms' quality dierence is relatively large, the other type
of equilibrium emerges and the unique optimal capital structure is obtained by the high-
22quality rms. A high-quality rm lowers its debt-equity ratio as its protability increases
but raises the ratio as the corporate income tax rate rises. However, the tax rate, unlike
other exogenous elements of the model, can never be a determining factor of the type of
equilibrium. In contrast with other signalling models, the overall results from our model
are consistent with empirical ndings and complement existing ideas on a rm's nancial
behavior. In this sense, our model highlights the usefulness of the signalling approach
and, thereby, contributes to a better understanding of a rm's nancial behavior under
informational asymmetries.
Our model may be extended in many meaningful ways. First, it may be further de-
veloped into a tax analysis model in which one can investigate the incidence and welfare
cost of the corporate income tax. Endogenizing the capital outlay, increasing the number
of production periods and adding other income taxes will make the model more realistic
in this direction. On the other hand, one can further explore the capital structure litera-
ture specic to rms' nancial behavior under asymmetric information. One may include
bankruptcy costs in the model, deal with the added dimension of the entrepreneurial moral
hazard problem, or consider a continuum of entrepreneur types instead of discrete types.






















































































































































































































































































































































High type's Maximum Debt Level (D
**) 
High type's indifference curve associated with his maximum utility 
Low type's indifference curve associated with his first best utility 
High Type 























































































































































































































































































































































Proof of Proposition 1
Equation (2) is identical to the incentive compatibility constraint (1) except X is
substituted for H(y2   DH). It is easily seen that the right-hand side of Equation (2)
is decreasing in X and, hence, X is uniquely determined in Equation (2). The objective
function can be also written as a function of X then a high type's maximization degenerates
to a choice over a singleton set fXg. [Q.E.D.]
Proof of Proposition 2














where i indicates type, H or L, and Èj is the wealth at the end of the second period in
which outcome yj is realized. Thus, È1 = (1 + r)BH and È2 = È1 + (y2   D); and we

















It is easily seen that MRS is positive and decreases as both  and D increase. To prove
identical slopes, we compute @MRS
@P i
1
since there are only two possible outcomes and Pi
1






















27Proof of Proposition 3

















































2   (1   )PH
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Therefore, MRS is positive for both types.


























where Ë denotes the denominator of MRS. Plugging in partial derivatives, we obtain a
negative sign of the numerator of @MRS
@P i
1




28Proof of Proposition 4
A low-type rm's optimal choice is the same as its rst best choice under symmetric
information. In equilibrium, it spreads all risk either by holding no inside equity or by
issuing the maximum debt. It also completely shields its output from tax obligations by
issuing debt more than y2   (1 + r)K. Therefore, the conditions (i) and (ii) are obtained.
From the viewpoint of a high type, there are two dierent types of equilibria, depending
upon whether it pays corporate income taxes or not. Equation (4) is obtained from Equa-
tion (3) with corresponding È
1 and È
2 plugged in after replacing DH with D and xing
 at 1. Since the indierence curves of both types are increasing in H and DH, D sat-
isfying Equation (4) locates the upper-right end of the incentive compatibility constraint
when high types are paying positive taxes. If D is less than or equal to y2   (1 + r)K,
the constraint is a single piece indierence curve and its upper-right end is the unique
separating signal for a high type, due to the single-crossing property. If D is greater than
y2   (1 + r)K, the constraint is made of two pieces. A high type does not choose any
point on the lower piece due to monotonicity and the single-crossing property. However,
all points on the upper piece give the same utility since the indierence curves of both
types are identical when there are no taxes. Therefore, any combination of DH and H
obtained from Equation (2), which is identical to Equation (3) with the corresponding È
1
and È
2, is equally optimal for a high type. [Q.E.D.]
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Taking D as a function of PH













2 ((1 )y2 +(1+r)K) D(1 )(y2  D) D(1+r)K);























is positive since D > y1 and the denominator is also positive
since it is identical to
@EU









is then negative, and result (i) follows. [Q.E.D]











2 ((1   )y2 + (1 + r)K + PH

















It is easily seen that both numerator and denominator of
dD
d
are positive, and hence
result (ii) follows. [Q.E.D]
Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Taking D as a function of PH






















1 y1 + PH
2 D + (1 + r)(w0   K) and 
2 = 
1 + y2   D. One can easily





numerator is also positive if D > y1, which is satised when y2   (1 + r)K > y1 since
D > y2   (1 + r)K. [Q.E.D.]
(ii) Taking  as a function of PH







1 u0(1) + PL
2 u0(2))(y2   y1   (1 + r)K)
(PL
1 PH
2 u0(1)   PH
1 PL
2 u0(2))(1 + r)K
;
where 1 = PH
1 y1 + PH
2 (y2   (1 + r)K) + (1 + r)(w0   K) + (1   )PH
2 (1 + r)K and




2 , 2 > 1 and u0 is decreasing,
30the denominator is positive. One can easily see that the numerator is also positive if
y2 > y1 + (1 + r)K. [Q.E.D.]
Proof of Proposition 7
(i) Proof shown as part of the proof to Proposition 5.
(ii) A proof by contradiction is as follows: suppose not, then there exists a   (< 1)
such that D(  ) = y2   (1 + r)K due to the continuity of utility functions. Let D1 and
D2, respectively, denote D(1) and D(  ). Then D1 > D2, and we have the following
relationship from Equation (4):
PL
1 u(PH
1 y1 + PH
2 D1 + (1 + r)(w0   K))
+ PL
2 u(PH
1 y1 + PH
2 D1 + (1 + r)(w0   K) + (1 + r)K)
= PL
1 u(PH
1 y1 + PH
2 D2 + (1 + r)(w0   K))
+ PL
2 u(PH
1 y1 + PH
2 D2 + (1 + r)(w0   K) + (1     )(y2   D2) +   (1 + r)K):
Plugging D(  ) = y2   (1 + r)K in the above, we nd that the rst and second terms
in the left-hand side are respectively larger than those in the right-hand side. Therefore,
the above equality cannot hold and there is no tax increase that can push D above
y2   (1 + r)K. [Q.E.D.]
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